University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1913

Compulsory Service in Office
W. Gordon Stoner

University of Michigan Law School

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/1006

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Stoner, W. Gordon. "Compulsory Service in Office." Mich. L. Rev. 11 (1913): 478-94.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

COMPULSORY SERVICE IN OFFICE
T was "the policy of prudent antiquity," as Lord Coic4 has said,
"that officers did ever give a grace to the place, and not the
place only grace (to) the officer."1 A modern expression of a
similar thought is found in the maxim, "the office should seek the
man and not the man, the office." Have we Americans reversed
the process? Have we lost sight of these ideals? -Certain it is that
some popular notions which are not consistent with the spirit of
these maxims have grown iup in this country. Offices have come to
be regarded too much as prizes to be awarded to the favorite of the
majority of the electors. Campaigns and elections are thought of
as contests between individual office-seekers rather than earnest
attempts on the part of citizens and voters to select competent men
to serve the state.
These popular notions and conditions have had a direct influence
been largely the result of the misuse of the power of appointment
and of the attitude of the politician elected or appointed to office
toward the office and its duties. For years politicians elected to
office have used their official power of appointing the incumbents of
lower offices largely as a means of rewarding their political friends.
They have filled the offices under their control with their supporters
and favorites and have little regarded the qualifications of the appointees for the offices. Public offices are looked upon by the average official as lucrative sinecures rather than opportunities for real
public service. Personal or party advantage rather than patriotism
or a desire to serve the state is too often the partisan politician's
motive for accepting office. Where the officer cherishes ideals of
this sort, the public's interests are bound to suffer.
It is not remarkable that the public, which sees so frequently this
sort of official administration and hears even yet the politician's
slogan, "to the victor belongs the spoils," so much oftener than any
reference to the maxims above quoted, should have its notions as
to the real nature of campaigns, elections and offices influenced
thereby. As a natural result of this lowering of the popular ideals
of public offices and 'officers the public has come to have less respect
for the occupants of offices. Popular contempt for officials of the
lower grade, especially in cities, is at least partially responsible for
the refusal of respectable and efficient men to seek or accept election to such offices. Until very recently the existence of these conI Coke's Second Institute, 32.
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ditions resulted in a lack of interest on the part of good citizens in
the election of local officers. The feeling that a good administration
from the public viewpoint could not be expected from any of the
candidates for office induced in the voter carelessness in investigating and voting for candidates. Too frequent mal-administration in
office has made the public over-suspicious, and as a consequence
even the honest and fairly efficient local officer is frequently classed
with those who are dishonest and inefficient. This lack of discrimination and too ready suspicion on the part of the public has
driven many an honest and fairly efficient officer to return in disgust
to private life.
These popular notions and conditions have had a direct influence
local offices have been only only willingly accepted but much sought
after by politicians. It is a very uncommon thing for one elected
to office to refuse to take it. Either because the lower office is regarded as a stepping stone to some higher office, or from party loyalty or some more legitimate reason some men are usually ready to
take any office. If the person chosen for the office refuses to take
it there are nearly always some others who are desirous of the place.
These popular notions and conditions have had a direct influence
on the decisions of some of the state courts respecting a state's
right to compel one elected or appointed to public office to accept
the same and perform the duties thereof. At a time when there is
so much criticism of law and the courts in their interpretations of
law because they are so far in arrears of the life and thought of the
people, it is interesting to study the holdings of the various courts
of our country on this question of the power of a state to compel acceptance and adninistration of office. If the writer is correct in
the conclusions reached later in this article, those courts which
have decided that acceptance of office is not compulsory in this
country, furnish an exception to this principle of criticism. These
decisions supply good examples of judicial interpretations influenced
by popular notions and made without regard for logical reasoning
from the common law and against the ultimate interests of the public.
The common law doctrine respecting offices was that the king
had an interest in every subject and a right to his service and that
consequently the officer could not refuse to serve except with the
consent of the king or parliament. 2 As a corollary to this doctrine
it was held that an officer who neglected a duty incumbent upon him,
2 Comyn's Digest, Title Officer, x B; Rex v. Larwood (694)
Ray. 38o.

x Salk. x68, i Ld.
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or one who, though chosen for an office, refused to serve therein
had committed an offense against the king and was indictable therefor. 3

Even municipal corporations at common law were entitled

to the official services of their members and in addition to indicting the officer refusing to serve they were held to be able to impose,
by by-law or ordinance, a pecuniary penalty upon any of their members who refused to serve in offices to which they had been duly
chosen.4 In an English case, decided after the separation of the
colonies from the mother country, it was held that a by-law of a
municipal corporation imposing a fine on one who refused to accept
office did not exempt one paying the fine from serving in the office,
and a writ of mandamus might be issued to compel one to serve
even after he had paid the fine imposed by the by-law.5 It is worthy
of note that in practically all of the English cases on the right to
compel an officer to serve, the offices in question were elective offices,6 and about the same in their nature and incidents as the elective
public offices in this country. This general principle,, that one
chosen to office is obliged to serve therein and cannot resign at will,
has been recognized quite universally in the United States as the
doctrine of te common law.'
In civil matters, at least, the common law of England has been
adopted as the basis of our jurisprudence, expressly or impliedly,
by constitution, statute or interpretation, in practically all of the
states except Louisiana.8 By this, of course, it is not meant that
the common law as it existed in England prior to 1776 has been
adopted bodily and is all enforced by the American courts. Only so
much of it as was applicable to the circumstances and institutions of
our people and not repugnant to our constitutions and statutes,
became a part of the law of the land, and binding upon our courts.
As was said by 'Mr. Justice Story in the opinion in VanNess v.
9
"The common law of England is not to 'be taken in all
Pacard,
respects to be that of America. Our ancestors brought with them
its general principles, and claimed it as their birthright; but they
3Queen v.

Wyatt

(705)

1 Salk:

380, Ld.

Ray. ii89; King v.' Lane (1728)

2

Strange 92o.
4 City of London v. Vanacre (16gi) Holt 431.
King v. Bower (1823) 1Barn. & C. 584.
c See the English cases-cited hereinbefore.
7Reiter v. State (1894) Sr 0. St. 74, 36 N. . 934, 23 L. R. A. 68r; E dwards v.
United States (88o) 103 U. S. 471, 26 L. Ed. 314; State v. Clayton (1882) 27 Kan.
442, 41 Am. Rep. 418; State v. Ferguson (864) 3 N. J. L. o7; Hoke v. Henderson
(1833) r5 N.
1,. R. A. (N.

C. (4 Dev.)
S.) 1210.

I, 29; State v. Murphy (i9o8) 30 Nev. 409, 97 Pac. 39r, iS

sBouvier Law Dictionary, Vol. I, 371.
I2 Peters (U. S.) 137, 144, 7 L. Ed. 374.
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brought with them and adopted only that portion which was applicable to their situation."
Our next inquiry should be, Is this principle of the common law,
that the administration of an office is a duty which may be required
of every citizen and which the citizen or subject cannot refuse and
escape without the consent of the sovereign power, a part of the
common law which was not adopted in this country because it was
not in accord with American conditions and institutions? It should
0
not be so considered. It is true that it has been said that those
parts of the common law "which were applicable to subjects connected with political institutions and usages peculiar to the mother
country and having-no existence in the colonies, such for example
as offices, dignities, advowsons, tithes, etc.," were meant to be excluded. But as the rule of compulsory service was applied to elective and non-hereditary local public offices of which the term was
only one, or, at most, a few years, as well as to the higher hereditary offices carrying with them, as incidents, estates and high social
position, it seems reasonable to conclude that there is nothing about
the institution or the principle applied which makes it exotic in
this country or its adoption here illogical. As intimated by MR.
Jus rIC SHOPE in People v. Williams," these minor English municipal offices seem to have been regarded as a burden and they probably furnished practically the only occasions for the application of
the doctrine of compulsory service. The only incident which can
be said to constitute any real distinguishing feature betveen the legal
character of these old English minor municipal offices and public
offices in this country is the "officer's right of property in the office.
Assuming that the officer's right of property in a public administrative office under the common law carried with it the full and absolute
dominion which property in other things did, and this was certainly
not true,12 yet the duty of the person elected or appointed to office
to accept and administer the same did not result from or depend upon this property right in an office. There was no property right
in an office until the person accepted the office to which he was
'chopen. A-nd if the property right came after acceptance and really
originated in the acceptance how could it necessitate or be the origin
unless
of the doctrine that the person chosen to office must accept
3
must
we
stated,
been
has
As
power?
sovereign
the
by
,excused
"Chancellor

Bates in Clawson v. Primrose (1873) 4 Del. Chane. 543, 666.

573, 580, 33 N. E- 849, 24 I.-R. A. 492, 36 A. S. R. 54.
145 I11.
12Comyn's Digest, Title Officer, B 5, B 6, K 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7; Hoke v. Henderson

" (1893)

<i833) 'S N. C. (4 Dev.) 1, 17, 18.
"Pages 479-80 of this article.
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look to the relation of the citizen or subject to the sovereign power
rather than to the nature of public offices for the origin of the principle of compulsory service in office.
It cannot be said that the doctrine that the state has the right to'
demand the services of the individual citizen- is opposed to the spirit
of our institutions and to our general theories of government. In
at least two public institutions, the army, and the jury, the service
of citizens is compulsory. It is true that in both of the instances
mentioned service has been made compulsory by statute. But statutes of this sort have been upheld as constitutional,14 which is a
good indication that the principle of compulsory service is not opposed to the spirit of our institutions or our theories of government.
In discussing the right of the government to force by a military
draft a minor citizen to do military service, JuDGn BuTrL'R in Lana-

hart v. Birge," said, "It is a fundamental principle of national law,
essential to national life, that every citizen, whether of age to make
contracts generally or not, is under obligation to serve and defend
the constituted authorities of the state and nation, and for that purpose to bear arms, when of sufficient age and capacity to do so, and
when such service is lawfully required of him. The power to enforce that obligation, so far as the necessities of the state may require, is an incident of state sovereignty and the subject of state
constitutional and statutory regulation." Isn't it just as necessary
that the state shall have capable administrative officers as that it
shall have physically fit soldiers? Does the fact that there are generally plenty of citizens ready to accept office take away the state's
power to compel its citizens to serve if the need appears? The state
generally can and does raise its army by voluntary enlistment, but
the power to compel service by military draft remains and may be
exercised by the state whenever it wishes. From the- foregoing it
seems but reasonable to conclude that the principle of compulsory
service in office is not in any measure discordant with our institutions and the general principles of the republican form of government.
Many of the courts which refuse to enforce this common law
principle offer as the reason for their refusal, not that the doctrine
is incongruous with the nature of public offices in this country or
with our general theories of the duty of citizens to the state, but
that the people, in the constitution, or the legislature, in the laws of
the state, have evinced, expressly or impliedly, the intention to,
14 EKneedler v. Lane (z863) 45 Pa. St. 238.
25 (x862) 30 Conn. 438, 443.
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abrogate this principle."' One of the common statutory provisiolfs
which is frequently held to indicate the legislative intent to annul
this principle of the common law provides that every office shall
become vacant on the happening of any one of the following events
before the expiration of the term of office,--the death of the incumbent, his resignation, his removal from office, etc.17Whether the conclusion that such a statute has the effect of annulling the common
law is correct depends on the meaning placed on the word "resignation." If it is given the meaning of relinquish, then it seems that
the conclusion is correct, for if an officer can lay down his office
whenever he desires withQut the consent of the state he can refuse
to take the office at the start. But if the word, "resignati6n," is regarded as including both an offer to relinquish and an acceptance
of the offer, then statutory provisions like that referred to, mean
no more than that a resignation tendered and accepted vacates the
office. This is not opposed to the common law principle of compulsory service. It seems reasonable to say that the latter meaning of
the word is the one that the legislature intended. Under the common law a vacancy was created by surrender of the office and the
term "surrerider" included both the offer on the part of the incumbent to relinquish and the acceptance thereof on the part of the
king, either personally or by some officer or body which represented
The last above mentioned interpretation of "resignation"
him.'
is also encouraged by most of those courts which hold that an offiin the most
cer's resignation does not take effect until accepted, for
9
of the states there is a statute similar to the one cited.'
Some courts have argued that a statute imposing a fine on a per"the
son for neglecting or refusing to serve in office, recoghizes
20
Peroffice."
hold
to
refuse
to
a
citizen
of
power, if not the right,
haps the best answer to such an argument is to say, as the English
courts have said in such a case, that as the common law makes it an
offense to refuse to serve when elected to an office and the statute
v. Bus (r896) 135 Ao. 325,' 36 S. W. 63 6, 33 L. R. A. 616; Olmsted v.
77 N. Y. 378; Reiter v. State (1894) 5x 0. St. 74, 36 N. ]. 943, 23
o Fed. 460;
L. R. A. 681; United States v. Justices of Lauderdale County (882)
30 Nev. 409, 97 Pac. 591, x8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 120.
State v. Murphy (9o)
3o Nev. 409, 97
xi Barb. 91; State v. Murphy (19o)
'--Gilbert v. Luce (xSS)
Pac. 391, 3S L.. 1R.A. (N. S.) x21o; Reiter v. State (2894) 51 0. St. 74, 36 N. E. 943,
23 L. R. A. 681.
Is Comyn's Digest, Title Officer, K 9, Title Patent, G.
"Rogers v. Slonaker (1884) 32 Kan. 192, 4 Pac. 238; State v. Clayton (1882) 27
Kan. 442, 42 Am. Rep. 418; Clark v. Board of 3iducation (897) 112 Mich. 656, 71
N. V. 177; E dwards v. United States (i88o) 103 U. S. 471, 26 L. Ed. 324; State v.
Superior Court for Kitsap County (1907) 46 Wash. 6x6, 91 Pac. 4, X2 L. R. A. (N. S.)
"State

Dennis (r879)

20I0.

"Reiter v. State (1894)

51 0. St. 74, 36 N. E:. 934,

23

L. R. A. 68r.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

does not indicate that the payment of the fine is to exempt the party
paying the same from serving in the office or that the payment is
to be taken in lieu of service, there is no reason why the court should
say that the payment should have any such operation. 21 The English courts hold that one elected to an office can be compelled by
mandamus to serve, even after he has paid a fine, fixed by a by-law
of the city, for refusal to serve.2 2 Ordinarily a statute which fixes
a penalty for a certain act is not considered as'recognizing the right
of the person paying the penalty to continue doing the same act.
The law looks upon a fine as a' deterrent rather than a license fee
paid for the privilege of acting contrary to the statute. Why should
we apply a different principle to an ordinance fixing a penalty for
refusal to take office? The refusal is a continuing breach of the
statute. Generally the levy of the penalty will be enough to induce
the recalcitrant citizen to serve, but if that fails it is the reasonable
and logical course to allow mandamus to compel the citizen to do
his duty.
Another. statute that is considered by some courts to indicate a
legislative refusal to recognize the principle of compulsory service
is one declaring that upon certain contingencies, as for example
the failure of the person elected or appointed to office to file a bond,
or to transmit a certificate that he has taken oath, within a specified
time, the office shall become vacant. It is sufficient to say that such
statutes are quite generally treated by the courts as directory rather
than mandatory.2 3 Under such laws the default is generally treated
as only a ground for forfeiture and not a forfeiture ipso facto, and
if the sovereign power, the state, sees fit to excuse the delinquency
by granting a commission, there is no vacancy.2
The object of
statutes of this sort is to secure a prompt performance of the acts
preliminary to taking office. This aim is supposedly accomplished
by placing in the hands of the state the power to declare a forfeiture
if the proper steps are not taken by the claimant of the office.
There is nothing in such laws to indicate a legislative intent to allow
the person elected or appointed to an office to escape service therein
=King v. Bower (1823) r Barn & C. 584.
2 King v. Bower (1823) 1 Barn. & C. 584.
23City of Chicago v. Gage (88o) 95 Ill. 593, 35 Am. Rep. x82; State v. Churchhill
(1867) 41 Mo. 41; Pickering v. Day (1866) 2 Del. Chancery 333; Throop, Public
Officers, § 173; Mechem, Public Officers, §§ 265, 266; Schuff v. Pflanze (x896) 99 Ky.
97, 35 S. NV. 132.
24 City of Chicago v. Gage (i88o)

95 Ill. 593; State v. Carroll (1910) 57 Wash. 202,
so6 Pac. 748; People v. Benfield (i8go) §o Md,.z65, 45 N. W. 135; Throop, Public
Officers, § 173; Mechem, Public Officers, §§ 265, 266; Brown v. Grover (2869) 6 Bush
<Ky.) I.
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by refusing to take the proper preliminary steps. If such person
refuses to serve, he should be compelled by mandamus to do so.
Other statutes of the same general nature as the foregoing have
been regarded by the courts as abrogating the common law principle of compulsory service. 25 To refer to all of them would expand
unnecessarily the length of this article. P.racticaly all of them can
be shown to be not in conflict with the common law when they are
looked at historically and their object is considered. There are,
however, two or three peculiar statutory or constitutional provisions which it may be well to mention here. The constitution of
Missouri adopted in 1875 provides,20 "In the absence of any contrary provision, all officers now or hereafter elected or appointed,
subject to the right of resignation, shall hold office during their offi-cial terms, and until their successors shall be duly elected and qualified." This is simply a repetition of section eight of article two of
the constitution of 1865, with the addition of the words "subject to
the right of resignation," whichowere inserted in the constitution in
1875. It is impossible, of course, to know certainly the purpose of
the constitutional convention in inserting these words. The Missouri court has held that the intent was to recognize an officer's right
to resign at will and hence that the clause abrogates the common law
principle of compulsory service.2 7 The probabilities are that the
provision was placed in the constitution of 1865 in order to authorize officers to hold over after the expiration of their terms and until
the election and qualification of their successors, as they would not
be obliged or entitled to do without such a provision in constitution
or statute,28 so that the offices would at no time be without incumbents. The exception placed in the constitution of. 1875 might reasonably have been inserted, not with the intent to recognize the right
of the officer to relinquish his office at will without the consent of
the state, but rather for the purpose of exempting the .officer who
should resign and whose resignation should be accepted, from serv-

ing until his successor should be appointed and qualify. The doctrine that the holdover clause makes it imposible for an officer to
escape from service, even though his resignation be accepted, until
in this
his successor is chosen and qualified, was first ennunciatedIllinois.
2
1
in
sitting
court
federal
a
by
1875,
February,
country in
ts Reiter v. State (894)
§ , Art. 14.

51 0. St. 74, 36 N.

. 943, 23 L. R. A. 68.

State v. Bus (x896) 135 Mo. 325, 36 S. W. 636, 33 L. R. A. 6x6.
State v. Perkins (1897) 539 Mo. 1o6, 114; Mechem, Public Officers, § 396.

United States v. Badger (Feb. 1875) 6 Biss. 308, later affirmed in 93 U. S. 599.
See also Keen v. Featherston (19o9) 29 Tex. Civ. App. 563, 69 S. W. 983; Jones v. City
.9f Jefferson (x886) 66 Te-. 576.
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This fact seems to entitle to more credence than mere speculation
the above mentioned suggestion, for it is not unlikely that the decision came to the notice of some of the lawyers who were delegates
to the convention, which lasted until August 2, 1875. There can
be no doubt that the people have the right and power, either themselves or through their legislature, to abrogate the common law.
Yet when one explanation of intent is as reasonable and satisfactory
as another, that interpretation should be adopted which upholds as
a part of the state law the wise common law principle of compulsory
service.
An Ohio statute provided that "The resignation of a senator or
representative which is tendered during any session of the general
assembly, shall not take effect until the branch of which the person
tendering it is a member has accepted the same by a vote of a majority of the members elected to such branch exclusive of the person
tendering his resignation." In Reiter v. State" the Ohio court held
that the legislature by this statute recognized the law of the state
to be that but for such provision the resignation would take effect
without acceptance. The statute was in the form above quoted
until April 5, i893, almost a year before the decision in the case
mentioned, when it was amended by adding to it the folowing provisions, "but a member of either branch of the assembly may resign, at any other time, to the governor,, who shall have power to
accept the same. That this provision shall not apply to a memberelect of the general assembly offering his resignation previous to
the organization of the general assembly to which he has been elected." 31 The amendment really furnishes the explanation of the legislative intent in this statute. The purpose of the statute as it stood
before 1893 was stated in the title thereto to be "to preserve the
constitutional quorum of the general assembly." In the absence o1
any express statutory provision as to whom resignations are to be
made, the general rule is that they are to be made to the officer who
has the power to appoint, or to call an election to select, a successor.3 2

At the time of the passage of this act the power to call an

election to fill a vacancy in the office of state senator or representative rested in the governor. 3 By the operation of the rule just
stated resignations were made to the governor. This placed in the
hands of the _governor the power to accept the resignations of
" (1894) 5r 0.

St. 74, 36 N. ].

934, 23 r,. R. A. 681.

Bates Ann. Stat, of Ohio, Title I, Chap. I, § 37.
'- State ex rel. Sawyer v. Pollner (1899) 18 0. C. C. 304, 309.
Public Ofcers, § 413.
13 Stat, of Ohio (841)
Chap. 43, § 30.
31

See also Mfechem,

COMPULSORY SERVICE IN OFFICE

enough of the members of either house of the general assembly to
make it impossible for the house to secure a quorum. In order to
prevent a possible interference in this way with its business, the
assembly passed the law above quoted. There was no need for
the rule to be applied after the assembly adjourned because no
injury then could be done by the acceptance of resignations by
the governor, and so it seems reasonable to say that the amendment
of 1893, which was declaratory of the common law, was passed in
order to prevent any implication of the abrogation thereof by the act
as it originally stood. That this is a correct interpretation of the
legislative intent, and that the general assembly did not recognize
the law of the state to be that in the absence of any express provision to the contrary an officer may resign at will, is indicated by the
last sentence of the amendment, which provides, "That this provision (referring to the provision allowing the governor to accept the
resignation of an assemblyman when the general assembly is not in
session) shall not apply to a member-elect of the general assembly
offering his resignation previous to the organization of the general
assembly to which he has been elected." The evident purpose of this
clause was to keep assemblymen from resigning between the time
of their election and the meeting of the asembly. But if in the
absence of express statutory provision the law in Ohio be recognized
to be that the officer may resign at will, then the latter clause is
useless for the purpose suggested, because it would result in placing
less restraint on resignations than if it had been omitted, and this
result was evidently not the one intended. It is a rule of statutory
construction that courts are not at liberty to disregard any part of
a statute but must give every part some meaning which shall consist
with reason and common sense,53 and the construction of each part
must, if possible, be in-harmony with the general purpose of the
enactment. 5 It is quite impossible to follow this rule of construction and reach any other conclusion than that above, as to the meaning of the statute in question, or the intent of the legislators in passing it.
A statute of Nevada provides as follows: "Any person who shall
receive a commission, or a certificate of election or appointment,
shall be at liberty to resign such office, though he may not have
entered upon the execution of its duties or taken the requisite oath
-

36State v. Turnpike Company (.865) z6 0. St. 308, 320; Sutherland's Statutory
Construction, § 240.
IsConverse v. United States (1858) 21 How. 463, 467; Sutherland's Statutory Conatruction, § 240.
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of office." 30The Nevada courts have held this statute to empower
an officer to resign at will, 37 and hence to refuse to recognize the

right of the state to compel service in office. As suggested by the
counsel for the petitioner in the case of State v. Murphy,8 it is probable that this provision was intended, not to do away with the necessity of acceptance of a resignation to make it effective and hence
with the rule of compulsory service in office, but to abrogate "the
common law rule that an office could not be resigned in any manner
until it was actually occupied," which was decided, in 1864, to be
the rule in California."9 The Nevada statute in question was passed
less than two years later, and it is very reasonable to suppose that
the territorial ligislature enacted this statute to forestall the courts
of the territory from ever laying down for Nevada the rule which
the California courts had adopted.
The conclusion from the foregoing is that the principle of compulsory service is not opposed to the spirit of our government or
the nature of our institutions; that it therefore became a part of
the law of the various states on the adoption of the common law;
and that few, if any, of the statutory or constitutional provisions
of the various states really show a legislative intent to abrogate the
principle.
As has been intimated 4' the various courts of this country are not
agreed on the question of compulsory service in office. In only
one case in the United States has the question whether a citizen
chosen to an office can be compelled to accept and administer it
been squarely raised, and in that case the court decided the question
in the affirmative. 42 The cases on the question of the right of an
officer to resign, however, are directly in point, as there is nothing
in the nature of a contract between the officer and the state and the
only basis for the refusal to allow an officer to resign at will without
the necessity of an acceptance is the legal duty which a citizen owes
to the state to serve it in the civil capacity of an officer unless
excused therefrom.4 3 It is therefore proper to count as in favor of
80Compiled

Laws of Nevada, § 1814.
2 State v. Murphy (igog) 30 Nev. 409, 97 Pac. 391, 1S L. R. A. (N. S.) z28o.
SSo30Nev. 416.
'9Miller v. Sacremento (April, 1864) 25 Cal. 93. See also People v. Ward (1895)
107 Cal. 236, where the doctrine was reaffirmed.
0 March 9, 1866.
41 Page 479 of this article.
4- People v. Williams (1893) 845 Ill. 573, 33 N. I . 849, 24 L. R. A. 492, 36 A. S, R.
514.
3State v. Ferguson (1864) 31 N. J. L. 107, 122; State v. Murphy (89o8) 30 Nev,
409, 424, 97 Pac. 391, x8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1210.
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the rule of compulsory service all those states which recognize the
doctrine that a resignation does not take effect so as to excuse from
service the officer tendering it until it is accepted by the state.
On this basis nine states- Illinois,4 4 South Carolza,15 Kansas,4 6
49
1
f'fashingtob,7 Michigans North Carolina,
Virginia,
New ler51
sey, and Te.xrasperhaps four others- Kentucky," Georgia,"
Tennessee,'" and New Hamtpshire"q-and the territory of Alaska,5T
favor the rule of compulsory service. Counting as against the rule
"4People v. Williams
5r4.
4State

(1893)

'45 Ill. 573, 33 N. E. 849,

24 L..

ex rel. Jernigan v. Stickley (sgoS) 8o S. C. 64, 6r S.

"State v. Clayton (1882)
32 Kan. 191, 4 Pac. 138.

27

Kan.

442, 41

R. A.
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36 A. S. R.

E. 21r.

Am. Rep. 418; Rogers v. Slonaker (1884)

' State v. Superior Court of Kitsap County (1907) 46 Wash. 616, g9 Pac. 4, 12
L. R. A. (N. S.) soxo.
4sClark v. Board of Education (189 7 ) 112Mich 656, 7r I. W. 177; Edwards v.
United States (i88o) 103 U. S. 471, 26 L. Ed. 314.
42Hoke v. Henderson (1833) 15 N. C. (4 Dev.) x, 29.
60Coleman v. Sands (19o)
87 Va. 689, 13 S. E. 148. (Virtually overruling the
case of Bunting v. Willis (1876) 27 Gratt. 144, which is so often cited as sustaining the
proposition that an officer can -resign at will; the court in the latter case regarded
the principle that an acceptance is not necessary to give effect to a resignation as set
forth in Bunting v. Willis as unnecessary to the decision in that case, and distinguished
between the two cases on the ground that in the case at bar the office concerned was a
local one while in Bunting v. Willis a federal office was under discussion.
"IState v. Ferguson (1864) 31 N. J. L. o7.
52
McGhee v. Dickey (1893) 4 Tex. Civ. App. 104; Jones v. City of Jefferson (1886Y
66 Tex. 576. (The decision in the later of these cases is based on a statute requiring
the resignation of a city officer to be accepted.)
53Patrick v. Hagins (1897) i9 Ky. Law Rep. 482, 41 S. W. 31. (The question in
this case arose under a statute providing for filling a vacancy by election at the next
succeeding annual election if three months intervene between the happening of vacancy
and the time of election, and it was held that a petition alleging that the incumbent of an
office "resigned" at a certain date, three months before the next annual election, did
not show that a vacancy had then occurred as there was no allegation of the acceptance
of the resignation at that time.) See also Saunders v. O'Bannon (1905) 27 Ky. Law
Rep. xx66, 87 S. v. iio5, holding that a prospective resignation cannot be *ithdrawn
after acceptance but before the date specified for it to take effect.
r, City Council v. Yoamans (89o)
85 Ga. 708. (The descision in this case is
largely, if not wholly, based on the hold-over provision of a city charter; in the lower
court, however, the position was taken that an acceptance is necessary to make a resignation effective and the Supreme Court, while holding that it was unnecessary to rule
expressly on this point, expressed the belief that the ruling of the trial judge was "in line
with the main current of authority.")
rs Murray v. State (z9o5)
iS5Tenn. 303, 89 S. W. zoi. (Holding that a prospective
resignation cannot be withdrawn before the date fixed for it to take effect, if it has been
accepted before attempt is made to withdraw it. The court placed emphasis on the
acceptance as putting the resignation beyond the power of the officer to withdraw.)
wAttorney General v. Taggart (189o) 66 N. H. 367, 371. (The question of the
necessity of an acceptance was not necessary to the decision here and the court leaves
the answer a little in doubt, but it announces in no uncertain terms the state's right to.
the services of its citizens in civil affairs.)
See also Bowles v. Landaff 0879) 59"
N. H. 164, 191.
MTown of Nome v. Rice (1908) 3 Alaska 6oz.
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all those states which do not require an acceptance to make a resig60
nation effective, eight states - Ohio, 8 California," Iowa, Ala61
4
63
2
6
bama, ' Missouri," Nebraska, Indiana, and Nevada and perhaps New York 66 - and the Circuit Court of the United States for
the Seventh Circuit,67 refuse to recognize the principle of compulsory service. In three of the last nomed jurisdictions, California,
Iowa and the United States Circuit Court, the discussion of the
necessity of acceptance to make the resignation effective was not
essential to the decision as there was some act amounting to an
acceptance in each case. 8 The courts in three other of these jurisdictions, Ohio, Nevada and Missouri, base their holdings on statutory or constittitional provisions, which, if the writer's conclusions
heretofore set forth 9 are correct, do not warrant the courts' determinations. The court in at least one of the remaining jurisdictions, Nebraska, 0 depended for authority largely on the case of
United States v. Wright,71 decided in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Seventh Circuit. This case cannot be logically
-used as an authority in a case where a state office is concerned, because the courts must depend upon the common law for the rule
Is Reiter

v. State (1894) 51 0. St. 74, 36 N. U. 943, 23 L. R. A. 681.
69People v. Porter (1856) 6 Cal. 27. (Decided by a divided court.)
x2 Iowa 405.
"Gates v. Delaware County (86)
6
1State v. Fowler (19o9) x6o Ala. x86, 48 So. 985; State v. Fitts (1873) 49 Ala. 402.
aState v. Bus (1896)

135

Mo. 325, 36 S. W. 636, 33 L. R. A. 61o.

= State v. Lincoln (1876) 4 Neb. 260.
43 Ind. 1o5. (This case holds that an unconditional resig04State v. Hauss (873)
nation to take effect immediately, sent to and received by the proper representative of
1the state, cannot be withdrawn even though not accepted; it does not discuss the
necessity of acceptance to make the resignation effective, but the result reached in the
case seems irreconciliable with any other principle than that acceptance is not necessary
to give effect to a resignation.) See Leech v. State (188) 78 Ind. 570, where though
unnecessary to the decision the court said, "the modem doctrine seems to be that an
officer has, the absolute right to resign, and that his resignation, placed-in the hands
of the proper officer or body, vacates the office without an acceptance of the resignation."
Some doubt is cast on this as the doctrine of Indiana by the earlier case of Biddle v.
Willard 0857) zo Ind. 62, in which it was held that a prospective resignation may be
withdrawn at any time before it is accepted and after it is accepted, it may be withdrawn with the consent of the authority accepting. And see further McGee v. State
. 139 and State v. Huff (7909) 172 Ind. 1, 87 N. 1 . 741, in
<1885) 703 Ind. 444, 3 N.
which some importance seems to be attached to the acceptance of the resignation.
0 State v. Clarke (z868) 3 Nev. 566; State v. Beek (1892) 24 Nev. 92; State v.
(The last case
MIurphy'(x9o8) 3o Nev. 409, 97 Pac. 391, z8 L. R. A. (N. S.) xaso.
was decided by a divided court.)
0Gilbert v. Luce (x85i) ii Barb. 9r; Olmsted v. Dennis (1879) 77 N. Y. 378, 387.
6' United States v. Wright (7839) 1 McLean So9.
"8Gates v. Delaware County (1861) 12 Iowa 405; United States v. Wright (1839)
McLean 5o9; People v. Porter (1856) 6 Cal. 27.
"See pages 482-4 of this article.
'0 State v. Lincoln (1876) 4 Neb. 26o.
711 McLean 509.
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,of compulsory service, unless the rule has been expressly enacted in
the jurisdiction, and the common law has never been adopted by
the United States as a distinct sovereignty.7 2 Therefore even if
the federal courts hold respecting a federal officer that acceptance
is not necessary to make a resignation effective, or that a citizen of
the United States cannot be compelled to accept a federal office and
to serve therein, as they seem inclined to hold, 73 they should not be
followed as authority by the courts of the various states, where the
.common law has been adopted, in dealing with state offices, though
this rule should not be observed when a state. court is dealing with
a federal office. 74
The real reason present in the minds of the judges who 'have
found against the principle of compulsory service is, as the writer
'believes, that the rule c6nfiicts with the-popular individualistic conception of office and official service- the notion that every voter
should have an opportunity to seek office, but that no one should be
-compelled to take office if he does not wish to do so. Many men feel
that they should not be asked to take office if the salary attached
to the office is not equal to the financial return they are able to get
in private employment. They feel they should be called upon to
serve the state only when the money return to them is as great or
greater than they can get elsewhere for the same services. MI.
CHIEF JusTIcE LOWE of the Iowa Supreme Court, in Gates v. Dela-ware Coun1ty,7 5 said, "The right to lay down office in this country
is so clear and universally acknowledged, that it may well be questioned whether the officer appointed to take such resignation would
have the right to prevent it. Certainly no such power is given him
-in the law. It is true in particular cases, or under special circumstances, he might with propriety advise against it, but he has no
'absolute legal right to peremptorily forbid the act, or refuse the
resignation. Such is not the language, the spirit, nor the policy
of the law." The Chief Justice cites not a single case to support
his statement of the law. It is true there was at the time of this
decision but one decided case in this country which held that ac'ceptance was necessary to give effect to a resignation. 6 But the
11Bouvier Iaw Dictionary, Vol. I, p. 372; Swift v. Philadelphia, etc. R. R. Co.
(x894) 64 Fed. 59; Wharton v. Peters (1834) 8 Pet. 591, 658; United States v. Hudson
-et al. (x8x2) 7 Cranch 32; Gatton v. Ry. Co. (x895) 95 Iowa 112.
12 United States v. Deitrich (1904) 126 Fed. 676.
7Bunting v. Willis (1876) 27 Gratt. 144; and see Coleman v. Sands (i9o) 87 Va.
689, 13 S. IE. 148, for comment on this distinction.
73 (x861) 12 Iowa 405, 407-8.
r5 N. C. ( Dev.) x.
T Hoke v. Henderson (1833)
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common law had been recognized frequently theretofore to be in
force in Iowa 77 even by Chief Justice Lowe himself, 78 and it is
directly opposed to the principles stated in deciding this case.
In refusing to follow the common law rule MR. JUSTICE SWvNX,

in State v. 1A'Turph y 0 stated that even without the statutory provisions of his state, which, he argued, changed the common law, he
would hesitate to follow its principles. "The suggestion," said he,
"that a civil officer in this country may be compelled against his
will to hold an office, and that he is liable commonly for refusal
so to do, is not in accord with prevailing American ideas of liberty
of action." Later in the opinion he conceded that if a public office
be regarded as a public burden, which it is the duty of every good
citizen to bear for the public benefit and which he may be compelled
to assume, it necessarily results that one who has taken up the burden cannot lay it down at his own pleasure. Could anything less
than an explicit statement make it more apparent than this that the
Justice was influenced by the popular ideals and conceptions of the
nature of an office and the relation a citizen bears to the state?
Many other quotations from the opinions of courts might be
offered to support the writer's opinion, but it seems unnecessary to
do so. Perhaps it should be expected that judges, who must have
mingled and worked with politicians and perhaps have become politicians themselves in order to reach the elevation of the bench, will
retain the politician's views and ideas of office and-duties of citizenship after they have reached that eminence. If so, it is a sad commentary on our method of selecting the state judiciary.
After reading quotations like these it is refreshing to one who
has high ideals of citizenship to note the expression of MR. JUSTICE

SHOIS in his opinion in People v. W/illiams,0 where he said, "Under
our form of government the principle (i. e. that the sovereign has
an interest in the subject and a right to his service) applies with
even greater force than under a monarchy. In a republic the
power rests in the people, to be expressed only in the forms of
law. And if the duty, preservative of the common welfare, is disregarded, society may suffer great inconvenience and loss, before,
through the methods of legislation, the evil man be corrected. Upon
a refusal of officers to perform their functions, effective govern77State v. Twogood (858)
7 Iowa z52;Wagner v. Bissell (1856) 3 Iowa 395, 402;
Holmes, Brown & Co. v. Mallett (1840) 1 Morris 82; O'Ferrall v. Simplot (1857) 4Iowa 381.
18 stes v. CQrter (86o)
1o Iowa 400.
7 3o Nev. 409, 424.
so145 Ill.573, 582-3.
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ment, pro tanto, ceases. All citizens owe the duty of aiding in
carrying on the civil departments of government. In civilized and
enlightened society men are not absolutely free. The burden .of
government must be borne as a contribution by the citizen in return
for the protection afforded. The sovereign, subject only to selfimposed restrictions and limitations, may, in right of eminent
domain, take the property of the citizen for public use. -He is
required to serve on juries, to attend as witness, and without
compensation, is required to join the posse comitatim at the command of the representative of the sovereign power. He may be
required to do military services at the will of the sovereign power.
These are examples where private right and convenience must yield
to the public welfare and necessity. It is essential to the public
welfare, necessary to the preservation of government, that public
affairs be properly administered; and for this purpose civil officers
are chosen, and their duties prescribed by law. A political organization must necessarily be defective, which provides no adequate
means to compel the observance of the obvious duty of the citizen,
chosen to office, to enter upon and discharge the public duty imposed
by its laws, and necessary to the exercise of the functions of government."
Equally gratifying are the words of MR. CHiix Juszcz RuvrIN

in the opinion in the early case of Hoke v. Henderson,s' "The public has a right to the services of all the citizens, and may demand
them in all civil departments as well as in the military. * * * I

cannot doubt that the Legislature has the perfect power, if it choose
arbitrarily to exercise it, of compelling, not, indeed a particular man
designated in the statute by name, but any citizen elected of appointed, as by law prescribed, to serve in office even against his will.

' s2

In these latter expressions the justices were in advance of the
popular n'otions of their times. For in i893, the date of the latest
of these utterances, the great body of the people did not recognize
public service as a duty to be performed at the expense of personal
sacrifice, and it may well be doubted whether a majority of them do,
even to-day. The results in these cases were reached by reasoning
8'(1833) i5 N. C. (4 Dev.) 1, 29.
82See also State v. Clayton (1882) 27 Kan. 442, 444, where it is said, "The public
have the right to command the services of any citizen in any official position which
they may ,designate; and he may not after entering upon the duties of the position,
abandon them at his option. It is true that this as a practical question will seldom
arise, and is of little moment; for in this country there are so many willing and eager
to serve the public in official positions that the difficulty will always be to find offices.
for the aspirants rather than to find incumbents for the offices. Still emergencies may"
arise in which the absolute and superior right of the public must be recognized."
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logically from the common law and with no regard to popular
notions or ideals. The writer has no quarrel with those who criticise the courts for not giving more heed to the life, thought and
ideals of the people. He simply desires to point the warning that
even in following popular ideals there is danger that vicious results
will be reached.
It is to be hoped that the courts of this country will all eventually
come to recognize and apply the rule of compulsory service as it
is now recognized and applied in a majority of those jurisdictions
which have had occasion to consider the question. The practical
advantages of a uniform rule of this sort are many and manifest.
Not the least of the good results from a general adoption and frequent application of such a rule would be higher ideals of public
service and consequent thereon a relatively more efficient administration of the public business. As we advance in citizenship it may
be that the rule will be applied to force some citizens of recognized
ability, whom their neighbors have elected to office against their
will, t6 take the offices and perform the duties thereto. The advisability of such a course, should the situation ever arise, is not necessarily questionable. Often, under our present jury system, the
man who serves under protest makes the best juror. Is it not
possible that the same thing will be true of an administrative offiGORDONq STONXR.
cer ?
UNrvMRsITY oV MICHIGAN.

